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Restaurant Service for the '90s 
by 
Sandy K. Strick 
and 
Rhonda J. Montgomery 
and 
Charlotte Gant 
Much has been written about servicing the customer. In fact, every 
issue of Restaurants USA or Nation's Restaurant News offers an 
article designed to help restaurateurs more successfully service their 
customers. While the restaurant market has carefully zeroed in on 
the specific products and services customers require, no one has 
carefully addressed the heart of the issue. The authors discuss the 
"hospitality" in restaurant service. 
Products and services are important to the customer, but in the 
end the most important aspect of the dining experience is how well 
or poorly the customer is treated by the people involved with the 
restaurant. Service is the point of distinction in a fiercely competitive 
market. 
In 1972, there were 209,000 eating places in the country and 
1002 potential customers per unit. By the end of the '80s the 
number of units had grown to 330,000 and the number of potential 
customers had fallen to 732. In other words, the restaurant industry 
is growing faster than its customers.' 
Patrons and operators do not always agree on whether or not the 
guests are happy with how they are being treated. In the 1990 
Tableservice Operator Survey, a survey of 456 tableservice 
restaurant owners and operators, the National Restaurant 
Association found that nine out of 10 restaurateurs believed that 
their customers were either satisfied or very satisfied with the level 
of service they were receiving.' 
However, in an association Gallup survey it was found that only 
six out of 10 adults were satisfied with the service they re~eived.~ 
Perhaps the reason the restaurateurs do not have an accurate view 
of the customers' perceptions of service is because dissatisfied 
customers often do not complain. They just do not come back. 
"Hospitality" is a word that has become estranged from the 
industry that borrowed it for its identity, and yet hospitality is the 
key to a successful restaurant. Hospitable service in theory is the 
key to success in the hospitality industry, but in reality it is a lost art 
form. Perhaps hospitable service is a lost art form because people 
today do not even understand what service is. In a 1990 study by 
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Callan regarding the assessment of service quality, industry experts 
defined service quality as "the application of a level of hospitality 
which unobtrusively leads the guest to feel at home, well cared for 
and anxious to return.'74 
Many times diners go to a restaurant supposed to be one of the 
most outstanding restaurants in the city and leave saying, "So 
what?" Those feelings were probably not based on the atmosphere of 
the restaurant, nor even on the food. They were more than likely a 
reflection of the lack of hospitable service received from the people 
caring for the diners' needs. People enjoy spending time in places 
where service is the organization's top priority. Unfortunately these 
places are in the minority. The industry today is interested in 
providing the physical amenities and food that will increase 
revenues, but managers lose sight of the fact that  their most 
important asset is their labor force. Until they sell their staff on the 
importance of interjecting warmth and understanding into their 
service, the customer will still leave saying "So what?" 
Restaurants Lack Warmth, Understanding 
This lack of warmth and understanding within service attitudes 
is extremely detrimental when coupled with the new trends within 
customer preferences. Faith Popcorn, founder of BrainReserve, aptly 
described one new trend in customer preferences as cocooning, or 
"the increasing tendency for people to stay home."5 Popcorn says, 
"[People] aren't going out to restaurants as much. And when people 
travel they want their room to be like their home - a small cocoon 
so they will feel safe." 
Today's diners are more selective in how many times they eat 
out because of this cocooning behavior. Betsy Balsley, food editor of 
the Los Angeles rimes for 17 years, was asked what she considered 
the mistake restaurateurs make most often. She answered, "They 
forget service. When I go out to eat, I want to be pampered and 
babied."6 Diners want to be treated with warmth and understanding 
while they are away from their homes. Those restaurateurs who 
focus on maintaining a "cocooning" philosophy, and who instill this 
attitude in all those who have contact with their customers in the 
restaurant, will ensure that customers' needs are met. 
The primary goal of a restaurateur is, therefore, not always just 
the nuts and bolts of planning a menu or designing the kitchen. All 
of these things are necessary, but the restaurateur must know how 
to find, train, and keep employees who have the right attitude 
toward service. 
Although this idea seems obvious and simplistic in nature, most 
decisions regarding managing a restaurant concern cost control or 
the product itself, food. Managers often overlook the importance of 
developing the attitude and philosophy toward service tha t  
employees must have. According to Costello, the right attitude 
includes Courtesy, Attentiveness, Responsiveness, and Effort or 
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Extra Effort (CARE).7 Such service should be found in all employees, 
from the host or maitre d' to the bus person. The physical 
manifestation of this caring attitude will be a well-run facility, the 
primary goal of which is to provide complete and competent service 
to guests. 
Employees learn this att i tude in many ways. Modeling, 
personality, and training are three methods which contribute to the 
development of a hospitable staff. All these aspects interact with 
each other to foster an attitude of service among employees. 
Manager Is Role Model 
Don Shapiro, president of First Concepts Development, a 
training and consulting firm, points out the importance of the 
manager as a role model. He says, "Treat your employees the way 
you want them to t reat  your g u e ~ t s . " ~  Employees who feel 
appreciated by their superiors will convey that sense of appreciation 
to the customers. As Shapiro points out, employees notice if a 
manager smiles at guests or pitches in to help when the restaurant 
is busy, and they will learn by watching. 
David Romm from the Cornell School of Hotel Administration 
discusses the role that an employee's personality plays: "People who 
have good contact skills generally gravitate to high-contact jobs." He 
cautions, however, about depending too much on finding employees 
with a natural ability to be hospitable. With labor shortages and the 
growing demand for "the crafting and delivery of specific kinds of 
interaction,'' more on-the-job training may be required. 
Gary Penn, president of the Professional Waiters School in Los 
Angeles, states, "Ninety percent of the responsibility for awful 
service falls directly on management. . . Waiters are hired on the 
basis of a 20-minute interview and then are expected to learn the 
ropes by 'shadowing' another waiter for a week. . ."lo Although 
traditional on-the-job-training is vitally important to the hospitality 
industry, it cannot be expected to fulfill all the service training needs. 
It is imperative to develop a training program that will teach service 
attitudes to the people responsible for providing service to the guest. 
Training Programs Are Fundamental 
Therefore, actually training employees to exhibit more service- 
oriented behavior is fundamental in  today's competitive 
environment. Fortunately, it is also very possible, as many studies 
and programs prove. For instance, Barbara Whitaker Shimko 
reports on an employee training program called Project Transition, 
"created to screen, train, and place welfare recipients in full-time 
jobs in cooperating restaurants." Coaches helped these new 
employees learn such skills as smiling a t  customers, having a 
professional appearance, establishing eye contact, and being able to 
make small talk. Shimko reports that "not one of the 57 participants 
in Project Transition went back on welfare during the first year."" 
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Project Transition proves that  certain skills necessary to the 
hospitality industry can be taught. More training of new employees 
would only be beneficial to the restaurant industry. However, they 
will be more hospitable; overall service will improve, and increased 
employee satisfaction will decrease turnover. 
A restaurant does not have to implement a "special" program 
specifically and solely designed to improve service, however. An 
ongoing empowerment program for employees can be equally 
effective. By adopting a policy which gives employees the power to 
make immediate decisions regarding service, a restaurant will be 
able to improve its overall focus on hospitality. 
Customers Are the Ultimate Beneficiaries 
Once the restaurateur has established this attitude in his or her 
employees, this philosophy of warm and hospitable service must be 
conveyed to the customers. From the patron's first contact with the 
restaurant, the experience should be one of friendly concern for the 
needs of the diners. This concern should address all aspects of the 
customer's visit to the res taurant .  Diners calling to make 
reservations should be warmly greeted, and every effort should be 
made to seat the party promptly upon arrival. If a group must wait 
for a table, the host should give a fair estimate of the waiting time. 
Kathleen Talbert mentions the importance of giving special attention 
to frequent customers. She says, "If a regular customer wants to 
entertain a special guest, he'll go to the place where he'll be greeted 
by name, fussed over, given his favorite table, and brought his usual 
drink."12 If handled correctly, this initial contact with the restaurant 
will communicate the caring attitude of all those involved with the 
facility. 
This level of service must continue even after customers are 
seated. Starting with giving their order and ending with being 
thanked as they leave the restaurant, customers must receive a 
consistent quality of service. Restaurant consultant Karen MacNeil 
discusses the importance of service at  the end of the meal. After all, 
says MacNeil, the last impression is the most important one. Small 
services like checking back with the guests for that second cup of 
coffee and offering desserts are often forgotten.13 MacNeil also 
discusses the importance of properly busing the table, after the 
diners have finished eating, a service that restaurateurs often 
disregard. She says: 
Because clearing takes place at  the end of dinner, it has great 
impact. If you serve someone a wonderful meal, only to later 
disgust them with sloppy clearing, have you really enhanced 
the restaurant's reputation?14 
The language of service plays an important role in portraying 
this hospitable service attitude. Gen LaGreca, president of 
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Hospitality Industry Training, states that  "employees need to 
understand the proper language of service."15 Simple statements 
such as, "Hello," "Thank you," and "I'm sorry," coupled with smiles 
and eye contact, are important in proper service language. When in 
the restaurant, managers should try to pay attention to verbal and 
nonverbal communication because these things exemplify the 
organization's attitude regarding service. The fact that employees 
can be trained to use the proper language of service allows for great 
possibilities of service improvement in the industry. 
Above and beyond servicing the average customer, restaurateurs 
should always consider individuals with special needs. Doorways, 
hallways, bathrooms, and some tables must be accessible. Hosts or 
hostesses and maitre d's should be prepared to help elderly or 
handicapped patrons get to their table with ease and comfort. Baby 
chairs should be easily accessible and kept clean. Waiters and 
waitresses should be knowledgeable enough about the menu to be 
able to suggest meals that would be appropriate for heart patients, 
dieters, vegetarians, or others watching their food intake. All these 
individuals should receive the special attention necessary to enable 
them to dine comfortably and pleasantly. 
"Service is as important as facilities in hosting people with 
disabilities," says blind industry consultant Harold Snider.'' A 
restaurant staff, in being sensitive to special needs of a group or 
guest, should be constantly alert for ways to offer help. Individuals 
committed to providing hospitable service will continually reevaluate 
their treatment of their customers to ensure that they are not 
overlooking the needs of their special guests. 
In an intensely competitive market, restaurateurs must change 
their focus which has been on quality food, competitive prices, 
interesting ambiance, promotion and publicity, on anything other 
than the customers' needs. To remain competitive the focus must be 
on the customer. Hospitable service has to be at the root of all that is 
done. Focusing on making customers feel comfortable and happy to 
have come to the establishment will improve the chance that they 
will come back to eat at the restaurant again soon. 
"If one aspect of the hospitality industry in the '90s is almost 
universally agreed upon, it is that the demand for better service will 
be greater than ever before," says Karen MacNeil. "Those operators 
who succeed at all levels will see themselves as serving service."17 
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Financial Failure in the 1990s: 
the Case of Prime Motor Inns 
by 
Elisa S. Moncarz 
Because of widespread overbuilding, operating cost increases, a 
decline in economic activity, and other problems, a significant 
number of hotels and restaurants have recently sought Chapter 1 1  
protection under the Federal Bankruptcy Code. Many other firms 
have experienced some degree of financial distress that could lead 
to bankruptcy. The author presents statistics of hospitality firms in 
financial distress, focusing on Prime Motor Inn's initial success and 
the principal causes of its failure, which resulted in the filing of 
protection from creditors in Federal Bankruptcy Court. 
In 1990 business failures rose across the United States and in 
every major industry sector, a clear indication of the economic 
downturn that the country was experiencing. In fact, "most of the 25 
largest bankruptcies in U.S. history were filed in the last three 
years."' Financial failure for hotels and other lodging places 
increased 58.1 percent in 1990, whereas failure in eating and 
drinking places rose 10.9 per~ent .~  Exhibit 1 shows the failure rate 
per 10,000 listed concerns in both the lodging and eating out sectors. 
Exhibit 1 
Failure Rate Per 10,000 Listed Concerns 
Hotels El Eating Out 
Source: Dun & Bradstreet, The Business Failure Record, 1991 and 1990 editions. 
*I 990 preliminary data 
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Exhibit 2 
Causes of Business Failures in the Services lndustry - 1989 
(Hotels and Other Lodging Places) 
Source: Dun & Bradstreet, Business Failures Record, 1990. 
Causes of Business Failures in the Services lndustry - 1990* 
(Hotels and Other Lodging Places) 
Finance 
41 % 
Source: Dun & Bradstreet, Business Failures Record, 1991. 
* 1990 preliminary data 
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-- - - - - -- - - - - 
Table 1 
Causes of Business Failures in Service Sector 
1989 1990 
Economic causes 
Industry weakness 29.9% 34.3% 
Insufficient profits 10.3 14.4 
Inadequate sales 1.8 0.8 
Finance causes 
Burdensome institutional debt 15.9 15.0 
Heavy operating expenses 11.8 10.2 
Insufficient capital 12.3 15.5 
Indeed, the hospitality industry entered the 1990s with a series 
of challenges that threaten the survival of a significant number of 
firms, both large and small. "A host of economic and demographic 
problems have combined to challenge the phenomenal growth 
pattern set by the industry in the last two decades resulting in 
slower growth and fiercely competitive market place.773 Moreover, the 
Persian Gulf crisis and the economic recession that the United 
States experienced since the latter part of 1990 hit the hospitality 
industry really hard, compounding the problem. Pleasure and 
business travel declined, while confidence levels deterioriated. 
There are many reasons leading to business failures in the 
hospitality industry. Fewer than 10 percent of the failures are 
directly attributable to acts of God, neglect, or dishonesty on the part 
of management or owner. 
According to Dun & Bradstreet's Business Failure Re~ord ,~  the 
reasons for business failures can be broken down into seven major 
types: neglect causes, disaster, fraud, economic factor causes, 
experience causes, finance causes, and strategy causes. 
The Dun & Bradstreet Business Failure Record5 for 1989, with 
preliminary figures for 1990, revealed that the economic factor 
causes contributed more than any other category to the failure of 
lodging firms in the last two years (42.5 percent in 1989 and 50 
percent in 1990). Exhibit 2 shows that finance causes were also 
major contributors to business failures in the service sector (40 
percent and 41 percent in 1989 and 1990, respectively), an indicator 
of very tight market conditions. 
Table 1 indicates principal economic and finance causes of 
business failures in the service sector (hotels and other lodging 
places) for 1989 and 1990. 
According to Bjorn Hansen, a partner in Coopers & Lybrand, "60 
percent of the hotels in the United States are experiencing a net 
operating loss. The loss was expected to reach over $1000 per room 
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in 1991."6 The recession and the fallout from the Persian Gulf war 
aggravated the economic problems that the hospitality industry had 
experienced as a result of the oversupply of rooms triggered by the 
tax incentives provided to developers in the early and mid-1980s. 
"Business travel came almost to a halt holding the average 
occupancy rate to 60 percent for the first half of 1991."7 
"Although the impact of overbuilding has tapered off in a 
number of national markets, the lodging industry is still plagued by 
many distressed proper tie^."^ This resulted in a significant number 
of lodging properties not having sufficient cash flow to service the 
mortgage debt and meet operating costs. 
Prime Motor Inns Serves as Case Study 
During the mid and late 1980s, a company named Prime Motor 
Inns (Prime) was considered a success story in the hospitality 
industry, "the darling of Wall Street." Prime's stock was soaring and 
analysts from large brokerage firms were advising their clients to 
buy. In September 1990 Prime filed for protection from creditors 
under Chapter 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code and these same 
analysts were shaking their heads in disbelief. 
Prime was founded in 1968 by a group of real estate developers, 
Melvin S. Taub, Samuel Brodie, Herbert Kay, and Peter E. Simon, 
though its roots go back to the mid-1950s when it operated as a 
single family home builder on the East Coast. Since going public in 
1969, Prime's growth was both internal as a builder and operator of 
motor inns and associated restaurants and cocktail lounges under 
franchises from national chains (e.g., Ramada, Sheraton, Holiday 
Inns, Howard Johnson, Hilton, and Days Inn) and external through 
a series of major acquisitions. 
The firm's early focus was on properties in the Northeast and 
Florida. "Its early success had rested on its ability to build its motor 
inns at  lower cost than its competitors by doing its own site selection, 
legal work, financing, design, general contracting, and building and 
through aggressive marketing of its inns to corporations and the 
business  traveler^."^ It targeted the midpriced lodging market, 
focusing on the corporate and business traveler, a more stable 
revenue base than the pleasure traveler. Prime established early 
relationships with nearby corporate travel and meeting planners. 
Peter E. Simon, chairman of the board, reported to Prime's 
shareholders on August 30, 1983: "During the last five years Prime's 
net income and earnings per share have grown at  a compounded 
annual rate of 53 percent and 43 percent, respe~tively."'~ 
During the mid-1980s Prime's overall growth centered largely 
around the acquisition of American Motor Inns in 1984 and Howard 
Johnson Motor Lodges in 1985. The latter's acquisition transformed 
Prime from a regional, multiple franchise operator to a national 
company that was both franchisor and franchisee. Prime's stock 
became a favorite investment "with an astonishing increase of some 
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640 percent from July 1982 to January 1988."11 The Dow Jones 
Industrial average increased about 142 percent during the same period. 
During the 1980s, Prime's stock climbed from $1 a share in 1980 
to a peak of over $45 a share in 1987. The growth in market prices 
was accompanied by strong increases in revenue, net income, and 
earnings per share. 
American Motor Inns Acquisition Was Turning Point 
The year 1984 proved to be a major turning point in Prime's 
history and a new era of company growth. "Prime paid $238 million 
for American Motor Inns (AMI), which operated 50 motor inns, 
primarily in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina 
and a resort in the Virgin Islands and held an 84 percent interest in 
Universal Communications Systems, Inc., an independent telephone 
interconnect ~ompany."'~ The acquisition "broadened Prime's assets 
and operational base and doubled Prime's size."13 
The next year was to be even more outstanding than 1984. 
Prime was becoming one of the most profitable and rapidly-growing 
firms in the hospitality industry "with an increase in revenues from 
$95,952,000 in 1984 to $245,734,000 in 1985 (a fantastic increase of 
156 percent in one year)."14 By July 1985, "Prime had sold 23 of the 
AM1 properties to its former owner for $193 million, or 80 percent of 
the total amount it paid for all the properties and still retained the 
remaining motor inns."15 At the same time "Prime sold the 
franchisor's Reef Beach Resort in St. Thomas for $100 million to 
VMS Realty."'" 
In November 1985 another major acquisition was made by 
Prime, the Howard Johnsons franchise system. "Prime paid 
approximately $235 million for the Howard Johnsons name, which 
included 122 motor lodges and hotels and its 348 franchised motor 
lodges."17 Within two years Prime sold 120 of the properties for $295 
million, while retaining the franchises for which Prime earned 
royalty fees. "Prime received more funds through sales of a number 
of units than they had paid for the entire deal and their financial 
position improved greatly."ls 
Prime Revived Foundering Howard Johnsons 
Prime invested $70 million to renovate the company-owned 
properties while Howard Johnsons' franchisees spent an additional 
$250 million by 1987. Besides refurbishing, two new products, Plaza 
Hotels and Park Square Inns, were introduced, a new reservation 
system was developed, and a major marketing effort was adopted by 
Prime. "Development was stepped up from an average of 3.6 
openings per year during the decade before 1985 to 20 per year for 
the period 1986-1989."19 The reservation system was modernized so 
operators could do everything a t  the property level. National 
advertising campaigns were launched, with promotions from "turned 
upside down" to "this is Howard Johnsons" to "this is Howard 
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Johnsons now." "Prime went after the business traveler using print, 
television and radio campaigns which were very intr~sive."~' All this 
served to get franchisees excited about the Howard Johnsons brand. 
Peter E. Simon, chairman of the board and chief executive officer 
of Prime, commented in the company's 1988 annual report: 
Fiscal 1988 was another setting year for Prime in net income, 
earnings per share, and revenues, sustaining a pattern that 
the company repeated for 13 consecutive years. Since 1970 
Prime has achieved a compound annual rate of growth in net 
income of 49 percent, in earnings per share of 42 percent and 
in revenues of 26 per~ent.~' 
He further explained Prime's focus on internal development: 
"Prime is intensifying its internal development of new hotels and 
additions to existing properties. Complementing our development 
activities with others, we have in the planning stages or under 
development more than 14 new hotels or room additions totalling 
nearly 1500 rooms in proving or emerging markets."22 
During the 1985-1988 period, Prime sold 2.3 million shares of 
common stock for net proceeds of $89 million and sold $115 million of 
convertible subordinated debentures. Prime also invested in 16 
Holiday Inns properties financed by a publicly-traded Master 
Limited partnership, which netted $80 million. 
In 1988 Prime paid $82 million for 18 Wellesley Inns; its plans 
were to develop about 10 new units per year. It sold nine of the 
original 18 for $52 million and retained management contracts for 
the properties. 
As a result of these deals and Prime's obvious success, it received 
ravishing reviews from several analysts and other interested parties: 
"One of the savviest operators in the lodging industry."23 "Prime's 
emergence as a force to be reckoned."" "Prime is expected to be the 
biggest hotel company in the country by mid-1990."25 
Prime Reported Fiscal 1989 As a Record Year 
Simon began his letter to Prime's shareholders on August 
1989 by stating: "Prime realized another record year in fiscal 1989 
in terms of revenues, net income and net income per share."26 Net 
income and net income per share had increased 15 percent on a 
revenue increase of 11 percent. Moreover, "there were dramatic 
increases in room rates that reflected Prime's aggressive growth 
through acquisitions, franchising and internal development from 
1984 through 1989 (total room count included franchised property 
increases from 6054 in 1984 to 162,300 in 1989)."27 
Prime's apparent success was attr ibuted to "smart  
management," low cost development and operations, tight control, 
and an undercurrent of intelligence in development, operations and 
franchising of lodging proper tie^."^^ 
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In April 1989 Prime signed an agreement with New World 
Development Co. Ltd. of Hong Kong in which Prime "would 
participate in the acquisition of the hotel business of Ramada Inc. 
domestic franchise system. The agreement was part of New World's 
540 million deal to acquire Ramada's hotel business."29 The original 
deadline for the deal to close was postponed when Ramada withdrew 
plans to offer $400 million in high-yield securities that would have 
financed the company's restructuring plans. A new proposal 
announced in the fall of 1989 would change the amount of cash and 
stock Ramada's shareholders would receive. In addition, Aztar, 
Ramada's remaining casino business, would be required to raise 
$170 million in debt secured by the company's assets. The purchase 
of Ramada domestic franchise system vaulted Prime "into national 
pr~minence."~~ 
In the summer of 1989 Prime unveiled aggressive expansion 
plans that called for 50,000 additional rooms by 1994. The growth 
was to be achieved primarily through new construction, though 
conversions were to play a major role. Prime's plans called for about 
150 all suites properties, whereas Howard Johnsons would build 50 
hotels to be managed by the Continental Companies. The Wellesley 
Inns were to be renamed Wellesley Inns by Howard Johnsons; 14 
properties were under development and plans well made for an  
additional eight to 10 per year for the next several years. 
Prime Entered Financial Deal With Servico 
In 1989 a subsidiary of Prime "invested $64 million and made a 
bridge loan of another $74 million to FCD Hospitality Inc, a private 
company that was acquiring Servico (a hotel operating company) 
from the Southmark C~rporation."~'  Prime also entered into a 
consulting agreement with FCD Hospitality to help reposition 
Servico over the next several years. "Prime and FCD Hospitality 
intended to jointly develop the Royce Hotel chain (an upscale brand 
of Servico) domestically and internati~nally.''~~ 
Investors began "to feel uneasy about Prime since the Ramada 
and Servico transactions were completed amid declining values for 
hotels."33 As a result, Prime's stock prices experienced a steady decline 
in market value to the low $ 2 0 ~  from the peak of over $45 in 1987. 
Prime had achieved formidable increases in net income and net 
income per share during most of the 1980s. Yet, an article published 
in the Wall Street Journal in March 1989 focused attention on 
Prime's quality of earnings: 
Prime's recent gains have largely come from hotel sales 
and from interest income. By contrast, analysts estimated 
that Prime's per share income from its basic business- 
lodging, food and beverage and hotel franchises- had fallen a 
penny a share, to 73 cents over the past two years.34 
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Thornton 07Glove, an analyst specializing in earnings quality, 
noted: "Prime had been reporting a lower quality per share earnings, 
which will continue to erode the price-earnings multiple."35 
Along these lines, by examining Prime's income statement 
included in the 1989 annual report,36 interesting observations 
concerning Prime's reported profitability and quality of earnings can 
be drawn. 
First, net gains on property transactions of $26.9 million, $25.2 
million, and $18.4 million were included in Prime's revenues37 
reported for the fiscal years 1989, 1988, and 1987, respectively. In 
addition, interest and dividend income of $53.8 million, $38.1 
million, and $33.9 million were reported for the same fiscal years. 
These amounts represented 64.3 percent, 58.2 percent, and 62.5 
percent of the income from continuing operations before income 
taxes reported for those years. Accordingly, Prime's increases in net 
income and earnings per share were heavily impacted by non-core 
activities, as opposed to lodging and food and beverage sales. 
Second, this interest and dividend income reflected a major 
increase in mortgages and notes receivable from property sales and 
construction and development projects in 1989, the full year impact 
of a 1988 loan to a major Howard Johnsons franchisee, and the 
interest derived from the Servico 12.25 percent subordinated notes 
and the loan to FCD Hospitality Corporation, which financed the 
stock purchase of Servico. 
Moreover, the examination of Prime's statement of cash flow for 
198Ys reveals that the cash flow received from operating activities 
showed major deteriorations in 1988 and 1989, in spite of the 
increases in net income of 29 percent and 15 percent reported in 
those years. In fact, in 1989 only $1.8 million in cash was provided 
by operating activities ( on net income of $77.4 million), whereas in 
1988 a negative amount ($37.9 million in cash) was used for 
operating activities (on net income of $67.5 million). 
Cash flow from operations shows the cash impact of all 
transactions that enter the determination of net income. As a result, 
the net cash flow received from operating activities (cash inflows less 
cash outflows) will normally differ from the amount of net income for 
the period (reported on the income statement). The latter reflects the 
revenue earned from selling goods or rendering services net of 
expenses incurred in earning these revenues based on the accrual 
basis of accounting. 
Also, in 1989 $262.2 million of cash was used for investment 
activities, resulting in a net decrease in cash and cash equivalents of 
$73.3 million. Some of the major contributing factors to the 
deterioration of Prime's cash flow were as follows: 
an adjustment to net income of the net gains on property 
transactions and notes receivable, arising from operating revenues 
since these transactions did not contribute to cash flow 
FIU Hospitality Review, Volume 10, Number 2, 1992
Contents © 1992 by FIU Hospitality Review. The reproduction of any
artwork, editorial or other material is expressly prohibited without written
permission from the publisher.
the disbursement for mortgages and notes receivable of $179.9 
million and $42.4 million in 1989 and 1988, respectively (these 
amounts included the Servico loan and other property transactions) 
major acquisitions of property and equipment to implement 
the expansion and growth plan 
major increases in long-term debt ($222.4 million and $195.5 
million in 1989 and 1988) to help finance the acquisitions of property 
and equipment and the Servico financing deal 
1990 Began With Major Challenges For Prime 
An article in the November 1989 issue of Lodging Ho~pi ta l i ty~~ 
outlined Prime's three-part strategy for capturing the lion's share of 
the business: 
rapid new development (minimum 50 hotels per year for the 
next five years) 
an aggressive marketing program targeted to the business 
traveler 
Prime to continue buying up successful small regional chains 
like the limited service Wellesley Inns and AmeriSuites 
With the purchase of the Ramada domestic franchise system at  
the end of 1989, "Prime was to benefit from Ramada's presence in 
the Western U.S. where Howard Johnsons was only beginning to 
build momentum."" In addition, the Ramada deal was estimated to 
bring in about $50 million a year in professional fees."41 
Yet, the aforementioned optimistic vision of Prime becoming 
the industry leader took a different turn a t  the beginning of the 
new decade. In the January 22, 1990, issue of Forbes," Dana 
Wechsler reported a recent cancellation of a new proposed issue of 
300 million convertible debentures by Prime. More importantly, 
the article focused on Prime's quality of earnings reported in the 
1989 annual report to shareholders, its weak financial position, 
and  controversial deals completed in 1989. "While Pr ime 
managed to report pretax income of $125 million in fiscal 1989, 
only $9 million came from core operations ... the rest came from 
interest, sale of properties, construction fees, and the like."" Hotel 
financing had dried up and there were huge numbers of properties 
on the verge of getting in trouble. Prime responded to this 
problem by financing the transaction itself, which resulted in 
increases in holdings of mortgages and notes receivable of 80 
percent over the past two years to $593 million; some of the loans 
were second mortgages. 
"Making matters worse, Prime sometimes guarantees hotel 
buyers and their bankers a certain level of fee income in the form 
of either leases or a promised return. When profits decline, Prime 
makes up the difference and only a portion of those contingent 
liabilities were reported."44 A major emphasis was made in the 
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Forbes article on the April 1989 financing transaction to help 
purchase Servico. Servico had agreed to pay Prime $55 million in 
consulting fees. Those fees and interest on the deal accounted for 
about 30 percent of Prime's earnings in the first quarter of fiscal 
1990 (i.e., quarter ending September 30, 1989), whereas no cash 
had been paid to Prime. 
The negative impact of this, coupled with the high leveraged 
position and the weak performance of the lodging industry in early 
1990, resulted in a further decline in Prime's prices, closing at $14 
on January 31, 1990, a 68 percent drop from the mid-40s level it 
was trading in August 1987. 
Prime's earnings per share for the quarter ending March 31, 
1990, declined by 98 percent to .O1 cent a share (from 55 cents a 
share in the same period of the third quarter of fiscal 1989) on a 
revenue decrease of 17 percent. David Simon noted on the third 
quarter 1990 report to shareholders: 
Revenues and earnings decreased because no development 
income or property sales gains were generated in the 
quarter as compared with $13.6 million in development 
income and $546 million in property sales generated in the 
third quarter of fiscal 1989.45 
Although some analysts continued their buy recommendations 
in early 1990, their belief was that Prime's share price decline, 
and tha t  of the lodging group in general, was a function of 
negative investor perceptions relating to institutional financing of 
hotel development. Thus Prime's management had to prove that 
financing was still achievable to meet its development objectives. 
By May 1990, Prime's common shares were selling at a t  low of $10 
a share. This major price decline has been considered "what 
analysts call Wall Street's loss of confidence in Prime's ability to 
expand its business in the current market."46 
Prime Announces Agreement to Sell Interests 
In May 1990, pressured by soft hotel and real estate markets 
and a hefty debt load, Prime announced an agreement to sell a 65 
percent interest in its Howard Johnsons and Ramada franchised 
systems to Blackstone Capital Partners L.P. for cash and notes 
totalling about $200 million. The sale was expected to help 
"reduce significantly Prime's bank debt and improve l iq~id i ty ."~~ 
Furthermore,  the  sale of Howard Johnsons and Ramada 
"guaranteed Prime enough liquidity to hold onto the Servico hotels 
if necessary and avoid selling them at fire sales prices."48 
Indeed, "Prime was under pressure to reduce i ts  bank 
borrowings because both the size of its debt and a downturn in the 
lodging and real estate industry had fueled investor speculation 
that the company could face a cash squeeze."4g 
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Simon believed "that the Blackstone deal would enable Prime to 
maintain a significant stake in the future earnings potential of the 
franchises and allow the company to focus on growth in specific 
market niches: economy and limited service hotels ...'"O 
Standard & Poors contended that the Blackstone transaction 
would help to significantly reduce Prime's debt and improve liquidity. 
Yet, Standards & Poors decided to keep Prime's double B plus 
subordinated debt on its Creditwatch because "Prime would be 
parting with the bulk of a stable source of revenues from the 
franchise system while increasing reliance on lesser known 
busine~ses."~~ Margo L. Vignola, an analyst for Solomon Brothers, 
stated in a May 12, 1990, New York Times article, "A combination of 
events have really crushed Prime."52 
Prime Files For Bankruptcy Protection 
Shortly after the Blackstone transaction closed, Prime sought 
protection from creditors under bankruptcy law proceedings. On 
September 18, 1990, Prime and certain of its subsidiaries, saddled 
with huge debt and heavy losses, "filed for protection from creditors 
under Chapter 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code in the southern 
district of Florida court."53 Prime had indicated it might have to file 
for bankruptcy court protection unless its banks agreed to approve 
another $25 million loan and to restructure its debt of $550 million. 
Since Prime was unable to work out a satisfactory arrangement, the 
filing became necessary. 
Prime's petition for reorganization coincided with a similar filing 
in that court by Servico Inc., the principal asset of FCD Hospitality, 
and "one of the straws that proved to break Prime's financial back."54 
At the same time of the bankruptcy filing, Prime was stressing its 
operations' consistency. Joseph Gaynor, Prime's vice-president of 
corporate finance, indicated that "little change was being made 
operationally and no major layoffs were anticipated ... Prime was 
expected to emerge from bankruptcy in a period of time typical of 
such actions, 12 to 18 months."55 He further noted that "Prime's 
ability to emerge after Chapter 11 was contingent on financing 
situations for hotel construction .... If that should happen Prime 
would move forward with conservative financing as an operating and 
managing company."56 
Although Prime was expected to emerge from Chapter 11, "a 
report issued by the bankruptcy courts indicated that more than one 
quarter of Chapter 11 cases filed prior to 1987 were still pending in 
1989, while only 10 to 12 percent of Chapter 11 cases result in a 
successll reorganization of the debtor's business.'757 Additionally, the 
report asserted that approximately half of the Chapter 11 cases filed 
prior to 1987 were closed in Chapter 11 without confirmation of a plan 
of reorganization or were closed as no asset Chapter 7 cases. "From 
the Chapter 11 cases whose plans were eventually confirmed, an 
average of 740 days elapsed from date of filing until c~nfirmation."~~ 
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In the summer of 1991, Prime announced that it wanted to 
merge with Servico, which was also operating under bankruptcy 
law protection. "The merger could settle substantially all the 
claims between Servico and  Prime.7759 Pr ime loaned FCD 
Hospitality, the parent of Servico, $74 million in cash and took 
over $64 million in FCD Hospitality debt in 1989. The proposed 
plan, subject to approval of the bankruptcy court, would allow 
Pr ime and  Servico to  combine some asse t s  to form a new 
corporation. "The new firm would provide cash and newly issued 
securities that  Servico would distribute to creditors under its 
reorganization. The new firm would assume Servico's debt."'jO 
Many Factors Accounted for Prime's Bankruptcy 
There were, indeed, many reasons that led to Prime's collapse 
in September 1990. Among them are the following: 
Prime acquired an  astronomical amount of debt in 1989 
caused by two major transactions: the acquisition of Ramada7s 
chain domestic franchise system, and the investment and bridge 
loan to FCD Hospitality Company to help finance the Servico 
acquisition. 
Prime's plan to repay debts with the proceeds of the FCD 
Hospitality loan and with public offerings of securities did not 
materialize. On the contrary, Prime had to extend the FCD loan 
repayments in order to avoid bankruptcy. In retrospect, Prime 
should have seriously considered the  merits and demerits of 
developing the joint venture to purchase Servico in light of the 
significant amount of financial difficulties experienced by Servico's 
parent company. 
Prime relied too heavily on non-operating income sources. It's 
quality of earnings had been questioned by several analysts for some 
time. A major portion of its increasing earnings was generated from 
property sales, interest income, and other non-operating sources. 
Moreover, "Prime was using deceptive practices by reporting 
property sales as operating  earning^."^' 
In spite of reporting record increases in earnings and earnings 
per share, Prime experienced a decrease in cash flows, especially 
from operating activities. Prime reported a decreasing trend in cash 
flow generated from operating activities in  1988 and 1989. 
Nonetheless, investors ignored this negative trend since stock 
market prices were relatively high in those years. 
Several liquidity and solvency measures declined. 
Hotel and real estate markets were depressed. 
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Financing sources of hotels dried up, partly because of 
problems in the high-yield, high-risk junk bond market and an 
oversupply of rooms. Prime became very vulnerable because a major 
portion of its earnings came from acquiring and selling hotel 
properties and retaining management contracts. 
Finally, in 1990 investors lost confidence in Prime's long-term 
prospects and its ability to withstand difficult economic times. This 
resulted in stock prices dropping "from $38 in 1989 to $23 in 1990 
and down to 50 cents at the time of filing for bankrupt~y."~~ 
Table 2 sets forth major events affecting Prime Motor Inns' stock 
performance between 1982 and 1990. 
Table 2 
Prime Motor Inns, Inc. 
Major Events and Corresponding Market Prices 
1982-1 990 
Date Major Event Market Price 
Per Share* 
Aug. 1982 Rush to buy consumer stocks began $6 318 
June 1983 Prime reported a 39 percent increase in 
earnings and a rise of 24 percent in earnings 
per share in 1983. 9 114 
Oct. 1984 Prime acquired American Motor Inns 
for $238 million. 11 318 
Nov. 1985 Prime acquired Howard Johnsons 
for $235 million. 26 518 
Aug. 1986 Prime began the successful sale of the 
collection of properties acquired 
under the Howard Johnsons brand. 34 112 
Aug. 1987 Prime had successfully disposed of the 
majority of the acquired Howard 
Johnson's assets for approx. $250 million. 
Moreover, Prime reported a 39 percent 
increase in earnings in fiscal 1987. 
Nov. 1987 Prime took an especially hard hit 
during the October 1987 stock crash. 
Its decline was the largest among lodging firms. 25 
March 1988 Prime posted a very strong recovery 
from the crash lows of 1987. It reported 
a 40 percent owth in earnings per 
share in the p irst half of fiscal 1988. 39 
FIU Hospitality Review, Volume 10, Number 2, 1992
Contents © 1992 by FIU Hospitality Review. The reproduction of any
artwork, editorial or other material is expressly prohibited without written
permission from the publisher.
-- - 
Table 2 
(continued) 
Date 
Aug. 1988 
April 1989 
May 1989 
Aug. 1989 
Jan. 1990 
April 1990 
May 1990 
July 1990 
Sept. 7'90 
Sept. 18'90 
Major Event 
Prime aid $82 million for 18 hotels, land 
and re f ated assets with the intention of 
converting them to Wellesley Inns 
by Howard Johnsons. 
Prime signed an agreement 
with New World Development Co. Ltd. 
of Hong Kong to articipate in 
the acquisition o ! Ramada domestic 
franchise system. 
Prime invested $64 million and made a 
bridge loan of $74 million to FCD 
Hospitality Co. to help finance the 
Servico acquisition. 
Prime unveiled aggressive ex ansion 
R lans that called for 50,000 a ditional otel rooms in five years. !i 
A 1/22/90 Forbes article focused on 
Prime's deceptive accountin reporting 
of property transactions an f questioned 
controversial deals completed in 1989. 
Prime reported a 98 percent decline 
in earnings per share for the quarter 
ending March 31, 1990. Also, Wall 
Street lost confidence in Prime's ability 
to expand its business in a declining 
economic environment. 
Prime signed agreement to sell 65 percent 
stake of Howard Johnsons and Ramada 
to Blackstone Capital Partners for 
approximately $200 million 
Prime extended FCD loan re ayment 
dates raising doubts of its co /? ectibility. 
Prime attempted to restructure debt 
while preparing to file for bankruptcy 
Prime filed for bankruptcy 
Market Price 
Per Share* 
- - -- 
* On the last day of the month, unless otherwise noted; adjusted to reflect stock splits of 
4:3 declared in January 1986 and January 1985 and a 3:2 stock split in May 1983. 
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